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BALINTULO V. DAIMLER AG, 727 F.3D 174 (2013).
SECOND CIRCUIT CLOSES THE DOOR FOR VICTIMS OF
INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Emily M. Nellermoe*
INTRODUCTION
From 1948 to 1991, the South African government utilized a policy called apartheid to racially segregate and
discriminate against its nonwhite population. 1 During the apartheid regime, over three million people were forcibly
relocated, hundreds of protesters were killed in clashes with the government, and millions more endured political,
economic, and social segregation. 2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court officially designated
apartheid as a crime against humanity in 1998.3 During the era of apartheid, the government of South Africa entered
into contracts with several multinational corporations for products and services, including International Business
Machines (IBM), Ford Motor Company, and Daimler AG. 4
This case comment will discuss and analyze the opinion handed down in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 5 a
consolidated class action lawsuit brought in U.S. federal district court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 6 In
Balintulo, the Second Circuit narrowly interprets the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,7 providing an answer to the following question: can multinational corporations that conducted business in a
foreign country be held liable for tortious acts of human rights violations that occurred in that foreign country?

I. HISTORY
The ATS was originally enacted over two hundred years ago as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 8 Despite
laying dormant for most of its existence, the ATS has recently received a substantial amount of attention due to its
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1
See generally Apartheid, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/29332/apartheid (last updated Aug. 25, 2014) (providing an entry on “apartheid”).
2
See generally South Africa Profile: Timeline, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094918 (last updated
Jan. 2, 2015) (providing a timeline of major historical events in South Africa).
3
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pt. II, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
4
See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
5
Id.
6
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). The ATS is also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), or the Alien Tort Act (ATA).
See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3661.2 (4th ed. 2014).
7
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
8
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

revival in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).9 The statute confers federal jurisdiction over “all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 10 In other
words, foreign nationals may utilize the U.S. court system as a venue to sue individual or corporate11 defendants for
torts associated with alleged human rights violations under federal common law. 12
For years, most courts operated under the assumption that a geographical connection between the place of the
alleged violation and the United State’s territory was unnecessary for ATS jurisdiction.13 This all changed in 2013
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.14 There, Mr. and Mrs. Kiobel, Nigerian
nationals who had been granted political asylum and legal residency in the U.S., filed suit in U.S. district court under
the ATS alleging that Royal Dutch Petroleum, Shell Petroleum, and their joint Nigerian subsidiary “aided and
abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.” 15 The district court
dismissed several of the Kiobels’ claims,16 and on appeal the Second Circuit dismissed their complaint entirely.17
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide “whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a
cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.”18
To answer this, the Court had to decide whether the “presumption against extraterritorial application,” a canon
of statutory interpretation, applies to ATS claims. 19 This presumption provides that “when a statute gives no clear

9

See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3661.1 (4th ed. 2014) (“Despite the statute’s ancient lineage, its possible range of application has been focused on only during the
past few decades.”).
10
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
11
The issue of whether the ATS encompasses corporate defendants is unsettled. See discussion infra pp. 11–13.
12
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
13
See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 180–181 (2013) (“Although the plaintiffs did not claim that any of
the South African government’s alleged violations of the law of nations occurred in the U.S., at the time they filed their
complaint they assumed (as did most American courts at that time) that no such geographical connection was necessary.” (citing
Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[N]o court to our knowledge has ever held that
[the ATS] doesn’t apply extraterritorially.”))).
14
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
15
Id. at 1662. The specific facts of Kiobel are as follows: Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Petroleum had a joint
subsidiary incorporated in Nigeria (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.), which “engaged in oil exploration
and production in Ogoniland.” Id. Many citizens of Ogoniland initiated protests against SPDC and their harmful environmental
exploitation. Id. SPDC responded by “enlist[ing] the Nigerian Government to violently suppress the burgeoning demonstrations.”
Id. The Kiobels alleged that the “Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ognoi villages, beating, raping, killing, and
arresting residents and destroying or looting their property.” Id. The complaint further alleged that SPDC “aided and abetted
these atrocities by, among other things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as well as by
allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.” Id. at 1662–63.
16
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
17
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d. 111, 149 (2nd Cir. 2010).
18
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662.
19
Id. at 1664.

indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.” 20 After examining the language of the ATS, the Court
determined that “nothing in the text of the statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under
it to have extraterritorial reach.” 21 The Court supplemented this by explaining that “the danger of unwarranted
judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS[.]”22 This cuts against
the presumption against extraterrestrial application’s purpose “to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord[.]” 23 Accordingly, the Kiobel majority
concluded that the “principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . constrain courts exercising
their power under the ATS[,]” 24 barring the Kiobels’ case since all “relevant conduct took place outside of the
United States.”25
Importantly, the Court provided the following guidance: “[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”26 The majority did not further define what it meant by “touch and concern,” nor did it
give specific instructions for determining what qualifies as “sufficient force.” As Justice Kennedy noted in his
concurring opinion, this was completely intentional:
[T]he Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding
the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]. . . . Other cases may arise with
allegations of serious violations . . . and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may
require some further elaboration and explanation. 27

II. FACTS
We now turn to the case at hand, Balintulo. In 2002, two class action suits (eventually consolidated) were
initiated on behalf of apartheid victims in South Africa seeking damages from several corporate defendants (Daimler

20
Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). There is a “presumption
that U.S. law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454
(2007).
21
Id. at 1665.
22
Id. at 1664.
23
Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
24
Id. at 1665.
25
Id. at 1670.
26
Id. at 1669 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264–273 (2010)).
27
Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring).

AG, Ford Motor Co., and IBM).28 The complaints first alleged the corporate defendants “committed both direct and
secondary violations of the law of nations” 29 by aiding and abetting violations of international law in South Africa
during that country’s repressive system of apartheid. 30 The plaintiffs claimed that under apartheid, they were
subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices, denationalization, geographic segregation, torture,
forced exile, arbitrary arrest and detention, and the extrajudicial killing of family members. 31 Specifically, the
plaintiffs accused Daimler and Ford of manufacturing and supplying military vehicles to South African security
forces, aiding security forces in identifying and torturing anti-apartheid leaders, and engaging in workplace
discrimination that “mimicked and enhanced apartheid[.]”32 Similarly, the plaintiffs accused IBM of providing the
South African government with computer supplies, maintenance, and support that enabled the government to
effectively carry out acts of segregation and denationalization.33
After a long and complicated series of judicial proceedings, the Second Circuit finally had the opportunity to
address Balintulo in 2009 when the corporate defendants petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus. 34 Defendants
sought to appeal the lower court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, “the jurisdiction
conferred by the ATS does not permit suits against corporations or apply to acts committed outside of the United
States.”35 The Second Circuit granted the defendants’ motion for a stay of lower court proceedings while they took
the case under advisement.36 As the court of appeals was considering Balintulo, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
final decision in Kiobel, significantly limiting the scope of the ATS and placing the Balintulo defendants in a much
more favorable position.
During supplemental briefing, plaintiffs argued that their suit was not precluded by the decision in Kiobel
because it was “based on foreign conduct when the defendants are American nationals” and because “the defendants’
conduct affront[ed] significant American interests[.]” 37 Plaintiffs admitted that under Kiobel’s sufficient force test,
“mere corporate presence” in the U.S. would indeed be insufficient for an ATS claim to “touch and concern” the

28

Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 183 (2013).
Id. at 182.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 182–83.
33
Id. at 183.
34
Id. at 181. Defendants also appealed under the collateral order doctrine. Id.
35
Id. Other grounds for appeal include that the case “threatened significant United States foreign-policy interests” and
that “the District Court erroneously imposed accessorial liability”. Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 189.
29

U.S.; however, they argued that their claims were sufficient and would meet the Kiobel burden because “corporate
citizenship” is something more than presence.38

III. DISCUSSION
A. REPORT
The Second Circuit finally issued its opinion in August of 2013, strongly disagreeing with the plaintiffs. 39
After a lengthy discussion of whether writs of mandamus are appropriate for reviewing interlocutory decisions—in
this case, the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss40—the court adamantly rejected plaintiffs’
arguments:
The Supreme Court expressly held that claims under the ATS [cannot] be
brought for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States. The majority framed the question
presented in these terms no fewer than three times; it repeated the same
language, focusing solely on the location of the relevant “conduct” or “violation,”
at least eight more times in other parts of its eight-page opinion . . . [l]ower
courts are . . . without authority to “reinterpret” the Court’s binding precedent in
light of irrelevant factual distinctions, such as the citizenship of the defendants.
Accordingly, if all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end
of the matter under Kiobel.41
Finally, the Second Circuit denied defendants’ writ of mandamus petition: “In light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kiobel . . . issuance of the writ is unnecessary . . . because the defendants have an adequate means of
relief through a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” 42 The Second Circuit vacated the stay imposed on the lower
court and remanded for inevitable dismissal.43

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 186–87, Essentially, the court explained that writs of mandamus are “drastic and extraordinary remed[ies]
reserved for really extraordinary cases. Id. at 186 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)). There
are three narrow instances where the writ is appropriate: (1) the writ-seeking party “must have no other adequate means to obtain
the relief he desires[;]” (2) the writ-seeker must show “that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable[;]” and (3)
the issuing court “must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 186–87 (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S.
at 380-81). However, the court stated that cases involving ATS questions are entitled to “greater appellate oversight” given the
“danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy of the United States.” Id. at 187 (citing Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013)).
41
Id. at 189–90 (internal citations omitted).
42
Id. at 188; 193–94. “[T]he defendants can obtain the dismissal of all claims now that the Supreme Court in Kiobel
has made clear that federal courts may not, under the ATS, recognize common-law causes of action for conduct occurring in
another country.” Id. at 194.
43
Id.
39

B. ANALYSIS
While I think the Second Circuit reached the correct final result in Balintulo, the panel’s rigid interpretation of
Kiobel creates unfortunate precedent that will bar many ATS claims that may have otherwise had merit. It was
obvious that the Supreme Court left leeway in Kiobel for special situations that “may require some further
elaboration and explanation”44 in order to overcome the presumption against extrajudicial application. It is well
known that legal presumptions can be overcome, which is why they are presumptions and not rules. Kiobel merely
“[left] for another day the determination of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be
overcome.”45 One could conceive of situations where human rights violations occur outside the borders of the U.S.
and still present claims that “touch and concern” the U.S. with “sufficient force.” 46 However, the Balintulo court, in
its zeal to dismiss the plaintiffs’ arguments, held that “if all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the
end of the matter under Kiobel.” 47 In fact, this was never stated in Kiobel. As Justice Breyer stated in his
concurrence:
The ATS . . . was enacted with “foreign matters” in mind. . . . Nothing in the
statute or its history suggests that our courts should turn a blind eye to the plight
of victims in that handful of heinous actions. . . . To the contrary, the statute’s
language, history, and purposes suggest that the statute was to be a weapon in
the “war” against those modern pirates who, by their conduct, have declared war
against all mankind. . . . [My] approach would avoid placing the statute’s
jurisdictional scope at odds with its substantive objectives, holding out “the
word of promise” of compensation for victims of torture, while “breaking it to
the hope.”48
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT
1. FINDING THE LIMITS OF KIOBEL
When considering the practical impact of Balintulo, it is first helpful to distinguish it from another ATS case
where the Fourth Circuit deemed ties to the U.S. were sufficient to overcome the Kiobel presumption, despite the
fact that all the violations occurred in a foreign country. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,49 the plaintiffs
filed an ATS suit against an American corporation, CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (CACI), seeking damages for

44

133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J. concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
And indeed there have been; see discussion of Al Shimari v. CACI, infra pp. 9–11.
47
727 F.3d at 190.
48
133 S. Ct. 1659 at 1672, 1674, 1677 (internal citations omitted).
49
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
45

the torture and mistreatment of foreign national detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 50 CACI, a corporation
domiciled in the U.S., provided civilian contractors (interrogators) to the U.S. Department of the Interior from 2003–
2004, which stationed these CACI employees at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.51 In a widely publicized
investigation, revealing events that President George W. Bush condemned as “abhorrent,”52 the U.S. Department of
Defense discovered that CACI contractors and U.S. military personnel perpetrated acts of torture and mistreatment
against the detainees. 53

The Al Shimari plaintiffs alleged that the “CACI employees ‘instigated, directed,

participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct towards detainees that clearly violated the Geneva
Conventions, the Army Field Manual, and the laws of the United States.’”54 Specifically, the Al Shimari plaintiffs
claimed to have been “‘repeatedly beaten,’ ‘shot in the leg,’ ‘repeatedly shot in the head with a taser gun,’ ‘subjected
to mock execution,’ ‘threatened with unleashed dogs,’ ‘stripped naked,’ ‘kept in a cage,’ ‘beaten on [the] genitals
with a stick,’ ‘forcibly subjected to sexual acts,’ and ‘forced to watch’ the ‘rape [ ] [of] a female detainee.’” 55
Relying on a strict interpretation of Kiobel, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ ATS claims, deciding that the
court lacked ATS jurisdiction “because the acts giving rise to their tort claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign
sovereign.”56
Plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, who heard arguments concerning “whether the
[ATS], as interpreted by the Supreme Court in [Kiobel], provides a jurisdictional basis for the plaintiffs’ alleged
violations of international law, despite the presumption against extraterritorial application of acts of Congress.” 57
Plaintiffs argued that even though the acts themselves took place in Iraq, the court should apply a fact-based inquiry
to utilize the flexibility built into Kiobel.58 In support of their “touch and concern” analysis, Plaintiffs alleged that
CACI “insufficiently supervised [its] employees, ignored reports of abuse, and attempted to ‘cover up’ the
misconduct.”59 Plaintiffs further alleged that senior CACI employees, including the Abu Ghraib site manager and

50

Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
52
Interview by Al-Ahram with George Walker Bush, President, U.S., in Dubai, U.A.E. (May 5, 2004).
53
See Amnesty International, Memorandum on Concerns Relating to Law and Order 11–12 (July 2003), available at
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2003/07/23/MDE1415703.pdf. See generally Chronology of Abu
Ghraib, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/timeline.html
(explaining that Saddam “Sam” Saleh Aboud is involved in a lawsuit against military contractor CACI International, Inc., over
allegations that Army Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski witnessed abuses at Abu Ghraib).
54
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 521.
55
Id. at 521.
56
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013).
57
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520.
58
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
59
758 F.3d at 522.
51

the CACI vice president, had knowledge of “potential abuse by CACI employees,” but failed to investigate despite
frequent contact with CACI’s U.S. headquarters.60
The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that, “the plaintiffs’ claims ‘touch and concern’ the territory of the U.S. with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the [ATS].” 61 The Fourth Circuit
specifically distinguished Al Shimari from Balintulo, stating that, “[t]hese ties to the territory of the United States are
far greater than those considered . . . in Balintulo” 62 based on CACI’s status as a U.S. corporation, the U.S.
citizenship of its implicated employees, the fact that its contract was issued in the U.S. by the Department of the
Interior, and the fact that its U.S.-based managers “gave tacit approval to the acts of torture committed by CACI
employees at the Abu Ghraib prison [and] attempted to cover up the misconduct[.]” 63
Because Kiobel was decided so recently, lower courts will slowly be building a body of law around ATS suits to
determine if “relevant conduct” “touches and concerns” the territory of the U.S. with “sufficient force” to overcome
the presumption against extraterrestrial application. While it is clear that the breadth of the ATS has been curtailed,
it is not yet clear which factors courts will find most persuasive, or the level of attenuation judges will accept.
Defendants should argue for a strict interpretation of Kiobel supported by Balintulo, while plaintiffs should look to
Al Shimari and draw as many ties between the defendant and the U.S. as possible.

2. CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
Another important practical issue raised but not thoroughly discussed in Balintulo concerns whether courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over corporate defendants in ATS suits.

The first lawsuit to implicate corporate

defendants under the ATS was decided in 1997;64 ever since this decision, jurisdictions have been split on the issue
and the Supreme Court has yet to definitively provide an answer. 65 To further complicate matters, almost every
recently published ATS case finding for plaintiffs has been remanded for reconsideration in light of Kiobel; whether
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Id. at 522.
Id. at 520.
62
Id. at 529.
63
Id. at 530–31.
64
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (naming corporate defendants Unocal Corp., Total S.A.,
and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
65
14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3661.2 (4th ed. 2014) (“Recently, the
question of whether [ATS] plaintiffs should further be confined to suing only natural persons has generated a flurry of activity
and a split among the courts of appeals.”).
61

the remands were based on subject matter jurisdiction, sufficiency of connection to the U.S., or for some other
reason is unclear at this time.66
Balintulo acknowledged the issue of subject matter jurisdiction briefly, providing a citation to Kiobel’s
predecessor, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2010). There, the court found that the
ATS did not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims against corporations, explaining “[n]o corporation has
ever been subject to any form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international
law of human rights.” 67 The Balintulo court also mentioned that the Second Circuit’s treatment of corporate
defendants was “long-settled” even before the Kiobel-2010 holding.
The D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (2011).68 There,
the court examined the history and purpose of the ATS along with the intent of the First Congress, concluding that
“[c]orporate immunity . . . would be inconsistent with the ATS”69 and criticizing the Second Circuit’s holding in
Kiobel-2010 for “a number of problems with [its] analysis” regarding jurisdiction over corporate defendants. 70 The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits have also held that corporate liability under the ATS is not barred.71
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to bar ATS cases naming corporate defendants despite having the opportunity
to do so; rather, it specifically mentioned corporate defendants in its Kiobel holding,72 implying ATS plaintiffs could
bring claims against corporations if they could show more than “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. Ultimately,
because the Court has only heard a few ATS cases, the federal circuits’ interpretation of Kiobel will control for now.
If and until the Court addresses jurisdiction over corporate defendants, the outcome of ATS cases will depend
heavily on the circuit where the case is filed.
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See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 148.
68
This decision was recently appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals where the ATS issue was remanded for
reconsideration in light of Kiobel. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
69
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 47 (2011).
70
Id. at 50.
71
See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736
(9th Cir. 2011); vacated 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
72
“Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
67

IV. CONCLUSION
The ATS has resurfaced with a bang after lying dormant for over two hundred years. Its relatively recent
rediscovery presents challenges in interpretation, which are currently being shaped by U.S. courts. Kiobel attempted
to provide guidance regarding extraterritorial application of the ATS and left flexibility for lower courts in deciding
questions of subject matter jurisdiction. However, in Balintulo, the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted Kiobel’s
holding, thus unnecessarily closing the door for future victims of human rights violations. Because of Kiobel, cases
across the country are being remanded for reconsideration, leaving the practical impact of Balintulo and cases like it
unclear.

